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 Analysis Considering the Significance of the Use of Naval Blockades During 
the Napoleonic Wars   
 During the course of the 18th and 19th centuries the British Navy took an age 
old method of manipulating and dominating an enemy, the naval blockade, and 
perfected it.  The blockade was going to be used by a generation of admirals, 
captains, and crews in a way that would cause financial, physical and psychological 
pain on a large swath of the western world, much of it specifically centered on 
ensuring that Napoleon and his aggressively expansionist France would pay too 
dear a price if they tried to move off of the European mainland.   The British 
Navy and its continued use of blockades throughout the 18th and into the 19th 
centuries showed the development of naval power on a scale that had never been 
witnessed, with entire fleets essentially set upon European harbors in order to 
ensure that French, Spanish, Dutch, Russian, and other potential enemy ships could 
not form a united front against the Royal Navy, nor could they threaten British 
territory, at least directly.  As a tit-for-tat struggle developed between the continent 
and Britain, this blockade expanded from strictly military in nature and started to 
include commerce ships as well, initially from belligerents, and finally expanding 
to any ship that was thought to be doing business with France or one of its 
subordinates. 
 The idea of a blockade was nothing new.  Used by combatants for millennia 
in order to block movements and the supplying of enemy militaries, it was 
perceived of as an attritional strategy using the navy to prevent the movement of 
supplies into the blockaded place, in this case, an entire continent. It has been used 
since the beginning of organized warfare as a passive aspect of siege warfare, often, 
though not necessarily in Britain’s case, in conjunction with land based actions.1 A 
total blockade though, including commercial interests, was new in the early 19th 
century as the navy became able to function for longer periods of time at sea and 
became both large and nimble enough to move quickly on targets as they presented 
themselves.  The idea of long term blockades was difficult to comprehend in the 
previous era as supplying ships, keeping crews generally healthy, and simply 
keeping the ships maintained for an extended time imposed extraordinary strains 
on the Navy.2  Since blockades were traditionally used in combination with actions 
on land, often times in order to siege towns and other strategic locales, the British 
used newly developed tactics to block off large swaths of the European continent 
without landing large numbers of troops, at least at first, changing the medieval 
idea of addressing a specific target with a ‘to whom it may concern’ attitude that 
                                                          
1 Andrew Lambert; H. Bicheno. The Oxford Companion to Military History. Online. 
2 N.A.M. Rodger.  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. p. 484. 
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 just was not physically possible for previous generations.3  It was argued between 
belligerents as to the legality of the blockade, but most jurists of the early modern 
era were of the idea that as long as a nation could effectively control movement of 
opposing forces then the blockade was a legitimate method of war.4  Napoleon 
would attempt his own blockade, at least by declaration, and this method of using 
declarations in order to stop trade was generally frowned upon, and eventually 
banned a generation later by the Declaration of Paris.  These ‘paper blockades’ were 
seen as detrimental to the exchange of goods between neutral nations and 
belligerents without the imposer having to actually exert the necessary effort to 
enforce it.5  
 The use of wide ranging blockades by the British during the course of the 
Napoleonic Wars continued to highlight the tension between belligerent and neutral 
rights. During the early period of those wars, particularly until 1798, the British 
declared the French coast from Brest to the Elbe River blockaded. France 
vigorously protested this action, and retaliated in kind by declaring a blockade of 
the entire British Isles. Great Britain then expanded its blockade to France, all of 
her allies, and the French colonies.6  Within a few short years Britain had essentially 
sealed off external access of food, raw goods, and finished products to millions of 
Europeans and effectively crushed the economies of some of the most powerful 
countries in existence at the time. 
 Already an established seafaring nation, with a very strong naval and 
military tradition, by the height of the Napoleonic Wars the British had, 
unquestionably, the most powerful navy the world had yet seen, and an impressive 
50%+ of the warships in existence by 1809.7  This included not only the strongly 
built British stock of ships of the line and various frigates, cutters, and troop 
transports, but also and increasing number of trophy ships captured from the 
French, Dutch, and other supposed naval power houses.  It actually became almost 
a point of pride to often keep captured ships the same name, just to emphasize the 
point that they were captured vessels.  The sheer number of ships available allowed 
the Admiralty to develop and efficiently support several methods of blockade, using 
the more standoff ‘open’ method throughout the Mediterranean basin, and a very 
antagonistic ‘close’ blockade along much of the Atlantic coast.  Such a 
                                                          
3 Edward Stanley Roscoe. “The Evolution of Commercial Blockade.” The North American Review. 
p. 346. 
4 Edward Stanley Roscoe. “The Evolution of Commercial Blockade.” The North American Review. 
p. 351. 
5 Charles Noble Gregory. “The Law of Blockade.” The Yale Law Journal.  p. 339-340. 
6 Michael N. Schmitt. "Aerial Blockades in Historical, Legal, and Practical Perspective." Journal of 
Legal Studies United States Air Force Academy. 21-86. p. 26. 
7 N.A.M. Rodger.  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. p. 482. 
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 confrontational posture was something not commonly used by other nations 
previous to this era as the resources involved were substantial, rather cost 
prohibitive, and a veritable logistical nightmare.  Having such a large advantage in 
numbers and quality of ships allowed the British to effectively implement this 
technique to great success for almost two decades.    
 Early on in the war the French fleet’s refusal to leave its harbors gave fits 
to British commanders, such as Admiral Hood, as they now had to settle for floating 
off of the French coast and play a waiting game.  Instead of a glorious, and quick, 
battle at sea, the British Navy had to instead develop a new technique as to the 
control of enemy ships, often with minimal or no real guidance from the Admiralty.  
This led to the highly independent commanders that would rise to prominence in 
the early years of the 19th century.  This independence was reinforced by leaders 
such as Nelson, among others, who would give stated end objectives of their 
strategic plans to their subordinates, and reward them if it went well, and take the 
blame for ‘bold failure’ if it did not, as long as they were aggressive, took the 
initiative, and showed skill.  Instead of a more traditional, top down style of 
leadership, having every move scripted, and no questioning allowed, the Royal 
Navy quickly developed into a dominant force because leaders and men were 
allowed to use the information in hand to make decisions that fit the battlespace 
directly in front of them.  This idea of an independent command structure also made 
it more difficult for enemy forces to anticipate what would happen next, as doctrine 
became more malleable to the situation at hand.8    
 Blockading reached a new level of dominance as Earl St. Vincent's use of 
the ‘close’ blockade of Brest and the Channel coast from 1798 into the first decade 
of the 19th century ensured France could do little but watch from safe harbor as 
British ships patrolled just outside of gunnery range from any port where French 
warships laid in anchorage. This ‘grab them by the belt buckle’ notion was the base 
of British strategy, successfully keeping the French fleet in port for large segment 
of the Napoleonic Wars.  Admiral Hotham to an extent, and, particularly, Admiral 
Jervis continued to increase the professionalism and ability of the fleet in 
conducting these close actions wherever French ships might sail from.  Obstructing 
movement of the French fleet allowed British operations from the Baltic to the East 
Indies to operate almost unimpeded, save the occasional privateer or aggressive 
French commander, for years at a time.9  The idea of a ‘close’ blockade was very 
difficult for the ships and crews taking parts.  The lack of movement, more 
specifically, the difficulty of keeping a sailing ship in one location made the 
endeavor problematic to maintain, as ships regularly required maintenance at 
                                                          
8 Andrew Lambert. Nelson: Britannia’s God of War. p. 31, 63, 73, 123. 
9 Andrew Lambert; H. Bicheno. The Oxford Companion to Military History. Online. 
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 British docks.  It was also obvious to those being blockaded as to the number of 
ships off of their coast, with a potential of making a move out at a time of less than 
perfect coverage.10   
 In contrast to St. Vincent, Admiral Nelson used an ‘open’ blockade off 
Toulon and the southern French coast in the Mediterranean, continuing the methods 
he learned from Admiral Howe, hoping to lure the enemy out for battle. Instead of 
attempting to physically hold back the French fleet, the Mediterranean squadrons 
would stand off shore, out of sight from land, and depend instead on spotter frigates, 
cutters, and sloops to warn of any movements by the fleet out of their harbors.11  He 
argued that though St. Vincent’s idea of getting in close to shore and keeping close 
watch on the enemy had its merits, he preferred the offensive action allowed under 
Hood’s open regime. Nelson also recognized that a close blockade of a port such 
as Toulon was difficult to impossible due to frequent winter gales and easy 
observations of an enemy fleet from high cliffs in the area.12 By leaving a small 
door open for the French to leave port, he hoped to be able to meet the various 
squadrons in open waters and ruthlessly attack.  This was something that would 
take two years, and would end his life, but would also ensure a large portion of the 
French Navy was relegated to the sea bed or into enemy hands.13   
 Since the Mediterranean Fleet did not have the advantage of having the 
British Isles as a backstop, and were also tasked with multiple duties that the 
Channel Fleet did not have to necessarily worry about, it was much more difficult 
to set up the close blockade on the southern European coast.  Innumerable harbors, 
small actors that ebbed and flowed from British allies to French protectorates, in 
addition to convoy and sea lane protection throughout the inland sea forced the 
Royal Navy to take a more distant approach.  To directly quote Andrew Lambert, 
“The Royal Navy stopped France from enjoying her conquests, and denied her the 
opportunity to rebuild her economy.  Everywhere there was room to float a ship, 
the British were to be found, harassing the enemy, and trading with anyone who 
could pay.”14 
 This proved more efficient so far from a home base because the 
Mediterranean fleet was chronically under-supported and consistently had to send 
ships throughout a large area for both resupply and other support actions. By 
keeping the French fleet guessing as to positions and numbers, Nelson was able to 
mask any inadequacies and for several years kept a numerically more powerful fleet 
                                                          
10 N.A.M. Rodger.  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. p. 482. 
11 Andrew Lambert; H. Bicheno. The Oxford Companion to Military History. Online. 
12 N.A.M. Rodger.  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. p. 529. 
13 Andrew Lambert. Nelson: Britannia’s God of War. p. 243, 254. 
14 Andrew Lambert. Nelson: Britannia’s God of War. p. xxvi, p. 31, 224. 
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 locked down and essentially untrained.15  Nelson’s subordinates such as 
Troubridge, Ball, Saumarez, and Collingwood ensured that the French and Spanish 
fleets were trapped inside of their own stations from the Portuguese/Spanish border 
to the Ottoman coast, albeit under a constant logistical strain that was not even 
imaginable just a generation earlier.   
 Staying at sea for years at a time, getting resupplied by cargo ships or the 
occasional carved off man-of-war was taxing on the men and on the ships, but 
probably even more taxing on the French as their potentially powerful navy sat and 
degraded due to lack of maintenance and proficient manpower.16  Staying shipboard 
also allowed captains an opportunity to better control their men, as shore leaves, 
particularly in Naples and Leghorn, also led to an outbreak of several venereal 
diseases that forced sailors and officers to be sent home a bit earlier than initially 
planned.17  Morale was always an issue, as blockade life quickly devolved into a 
rather boring, repetitive life.  Separated from family for literally years at a time, sea 
voyages became longer, and often with none of the extra pay that would have been 
tied to successful expeditions, fruitful trading, or the capture of enemy trophies.18 
 After Nelson’s heart-rending victory at Trafalgar, Napoleon instituted a 
‘counter-blockade’, what soon became known as the ‘Continental System’, closing 
all European ports to British trade.  This action angered France’s allies and quite 
possibly did more economic damage to the continent than it did to Britain, though 
from various Letters to the Editor and newspaper articles from the era it was evident 
that pain was being felt by the British population as well. For a short time Britain 
made efforts to keep Russia and other continental powers as neutral as possible, 
even after they formed alliances with France.  By blockading the primary enemy, 
while maintaining trade contact with the enemy’s allies, at least for the short term, 
it was seen as a beneficial method in keeping some of France’s allies on the 
sidelines, physically, if not diplomatically.  Britain continued to allow neutral ships 
to trade with them through blockades as late as 1810.19  Both the British blockade 
and the French effort to counter it contributed to wide ranging economic and civil 
unrest.20 
 By 1805 the military struggle between England and France had deteriorated 
into a war of economic reprisal.  Each side used blockades in an attempt to starve 
                                                          
15 Andrew Lambert; H. Bicheno. The Oxford Companion to Military History. Online. 
16 Arthur Herman. To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World. p. 399. 
17 Andrew Lambert. Nelson: Britannia’s God of War. p. 67. 
18 N.A.M. Rodger.  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. p. 526. 
19 C. I. Hamilton.  “Anglo-French Seapower and the Declaration of Paris.” The International History 
Review. p. 167; N.A.M. Rodger.  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-
1815. p. 551. 
20 Andrew Lambert; H. Bicheno. The Oxford Companion to Military History. Online. 
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 (both in reality and metaphorically) the other into submission, to varying degrees 
of success. When the British issued Orders in Council imposing a cordon on the 
northwest coast of Europe, Napoleon was forced to retaliate with his Continental 
System, a series of declarations that prohibited British trade with the continent and 
threatened confiscation of any neutral vessels found trading with England. In the 
middle of dispute between Britain and France was the then neutral United States. 
Without a functioning navy after the ignoble defeat of the French fleet at the Battle 
of Trafalgar, Napoleon was forced to confine his efforts to American vessels in 
French ports, a very limited and almost insignificant set of goals. Since it was 
difficult to argue against French sovereignty over their own harbors, the attention 
of the United States was focused predominantly at British actions that they argued 
violated international law, not only through the seizure of ships and cargo, but also 
through the impressment of some of the American crews.21   
 Britain’s stranglehold on the French (and allied) coastline forced France’s 
response in an attempt to counterbalance the Royal Navy’s highly efficient use of 
blockades.  The French imposition of the “Continental System” was to be nowhere 
near as effective as the British attempt, but would cause angst.  The economic 
blockade of Britain introduced in 1806 by Napoleon was intended to cripple the 
British economy and force peace terms in the Napoleonic Wars. The French were 
able to extend this system to Russia by the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 and to Spain and 
Portugal the following year, ensuring that virtually the entire European coastline 
was off limits to British merchants. Almost immediately the blockade included 
neutral countries and impelled a retaliatory economic blockade by the British 
against France and its allies.22  By 1810 Swedish King Charles the XIII signed on 
to Napoleon’s idea of blockading trade, primarily due to his nation being pinched 
between Russia and France.23  The British Navy expanded its already remarkable 
blockade, shutting down trade not only directly to or from France and its 
dependencies, but now between neutral nations and any French allies, generally 
shutting down any sea going trade along the entire mainland Europe. 
 At the same time Napoleon was attempting to lock down the European 
coastline American President Thomas Jefferson requested that Congress approve 
the Embargo Act, which it did in December 1807. All American ports were closed 
to export shipping in either United States or foreign vessels, and restrictions were 
placed on imports from Great Britain. The act was a hardship on American farmers, 
and quite possibly even more so to the commercial, mercantile, and maritime 
interests in New England and New York, especially after being strengthened by 
                                                          
21 "Embargo Act." Britannica Academic, Encyclopædia Britannica. Online. 
22 "Continental System." World Encyclopedia. : Philip's. Oxford Reference. Online. 
23 Caledonian Mercury, "Swedish Proclamation." 12 Apr. 1810. British Library Newspapers. pg. 1. 
Online. 
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 severe enforcement regulations adopted in 1808.24  Though at the time a political 
backwater and economically underwhelming compared to its European 
counterparts, the raw goods that the United States supplied to all sides in the 
European conflict were soon missed.  The continued abuse of American ships and 
crews by all sides would eventually lead to the United States entering into war 
against Britain in 1812. 
 French blockades were referred to as ‘paper blockades’25 as they did not 
have the ability to physically enforce them.  This idea of claiming a blockade but 
not actively trying to enforce it were eventually banned through international 
conventions in 1856.  These ‘paper blockades’ were in direct response to the British 
Navy’s overpowering harassment of French naval movement and international and 
seagoing intranational trade.  Though blockades were employed freely by the 
British and other nations throughout the 18th century, the question of the proper 
balance between belligerent and neutral rights continued to dominate the ideas of 
legality. In great part, this developed from the idea that late 17th century blockades.  
Examples include blockades of England in 1662 and France in 1672-73 by the 
Dutch, and of France in 1689 by the English and Dutch.  This later action had been 
considered a "paper blockades," since the blockaded coasts were simply too long 
for the navies of the era control effectively.26   
 The French navy had a substantial investment in warships, but weak training 
regimens, a depleted and angry officer corps, and Napoleon’s lack of interest or 
understanding of naval tactics made it difficult for the navy to confront the British, 
and even seemed to lock various French squadrons into their home stations for years 
at a time.  It did not help the French cause that, even though when combined with 
Spanish and other allied ships, the French Navy outnumbered the British, individual 
French admirals were fearful of confronting the British.  This lack of confidence 
and leadership at the highest levels ensured that what should have been a capable 
body spent most of the war at anchorage, except for a few commanders in the Indian 
Ocean, such as Admiral Allemand, and some privateers in the Mediterranean.  A 
side benefit of this, for both belligerents, was that because the ships stayed in port, 
approximately one third less  French sailors were taken as prisoners of war (27,000) 
than during the American Revolution (42,000), meaning the French did not lose the 
services of as many men, and the British did not have to house and feed them.27 
                                                          
24 "Embargo Act." Britannica Academic, Encyclopædia Britannica. Online. 
25 The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military. : Oxford University Press, 2001. Oxford 
Reference. Online. 
26 Michael N. Schmitt.  "Aerial Blockades in Historical, Legal, and Practical Perspective." Journal 
of Legal Studies United States Air Force Academy.  p. 26. 
27 N.A.M. Rodger.  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. p. 534, 
560. 
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  As France implemented their system of blockades against British interests 
it appeared, at least initially, that Napoleon might very well have been able to 
negatively impact huge segments of the British economy.  Forcing Prussia in 1805, 
and Russia in 1806, to sign on to boycotts of British merchandise through what was 
known as the Berlin Decree and the Milan Decree, all ships from either Britain or 
her colonies were for all intents banned from going to any mainland European ports, 
particularly in France itself, plus its vassal states of Naples, Spain, and Holland. 
Napoleon’s outlook at this whole situation was a mercantilistic idea that only 
property, people, and home industry mattered, and that choking the life out of the 
British economy through the denial of European trade would lead to a quick and 
efficient end to the war.  The size of this ‘Continental Blockade’ expanded as 
French troops expanded dominance over more territory.  By 1810 the entire 
European Atlantic coastline, from Gibraltar to the Baltic Sea was under French 
control, supposedly severely limiting shipping.28, 29   
 The idea of the Continental system being a threat to British interests was 
true only as long as Napoleon could control the whole of Europe.  The Peninsular 
Campaign, Russia’s leaving of the alliance, and the general difficulty of controlling 
such a widespread and unhappy conquered population made the proper 
implementation of such a large project difficult at best.  Once former allies started 
turning belligerent and current friends physically or financially unsupportive, there 
was little chance of the paper blockade doing anything of use for France.30 
 British economic troubles resulting from Napoleon’s blockade led to public 
complaints by many in the merchant and manufacturing realms.  The British 
economy was set up for a large volume of trade to come from and go to a worldwide 
expanse of colonies and shipment of goods through British ports, on British ships, 
to markets that were now off limits.  Britain itself did not have the population or 
money to absorb this trade itself, and very quickly pain was felt at every level of 
the national economy.31  Within months of France enacting of the Berlin Decree 
and Napoleon’s implementation of the Continental System, the British economy 
started to feel enormous pressures that would eventually come to a head.  By 1810 
British newspapers were reporting dozens of bankruptcies a week in shore side 
cities, all at least to some extent tied to the lack of trade with mainland Europe.32   
                                                          
28 Kevin H. O'Rourke. “War and Welfare: Britain, France, and the United States 1807-14.” Oxford 
Economic Papers. p. 8. 
 
29 N.A.M. Rodger.  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. p. 552. 
30 N.A.M. Rodger.  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. p. 563. 
31 "To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle." Morning Chronicle, 7 Nov. 1811. British Library 
Newspapers. Online. 
32 "Foreign Intelligence." Examiner, 23 Dec. 1810. British Library Newspapers. Online. 
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  To counteract much of this blockade system used against them, the British 
responded with a series of ‘Orders in Council’, starting at the end of 1807.  The 
British Navy started to seize neutral shipping if they attempted to sail to French 
controlled ports without first stopping at a British port.  This was done in order to 
force France’s hand, as it had banned any ships that had visited British ports.  This 
basically caused both an internal and external blockade against the continent and 
caused the continental economy to approach freefall rather quickly.33 Napoleon’s 
idea of having a self-sustaining, continental economy, resistant to the British Navy, 
was a calculated risk taken on the idea that the British would sue for peace first, a 
way he could “conquer the sea by the land”.34  The economic blockade would 
become the “principal weapon in the national armory.”35  
 Not surprisingly, neutrals stridently protested both the ‘British Orders in 
Council’, and the France’s severe limitations of neutral cargoes. Specifically, the 
United States expressed strong opposition, and the interference by both sides with 
American commerce and shipping ensured the eventual hostilities with both the 
French, though on a lesser scale, and with the British and the War of 1812.  The 
uncertainty concerning where to draw the line between valid belligerent procedures 
and the right of neutrals to self-determined trade regimens was even reflected in 
contemporary English court cases that invalidated certain seizures for breach of the 
blockade, though slow and expensive court proceedings ensured neutrals rarely 
ever got true satisfaction.36  The British Navy was forced to set up an imperfect 
blockade of the American coast that still managed to strangle US commerce, 
bankrupting many, including Thomas Jefferson. Interestingly, it was Jefferson who 
reversed the policy of accommodation with the British that had permitted American 
exports to go up significantly from 1794–1801.  By rejecting a British offer trade 
treaty in 1806 and imposing his own ‘continental system’ that had no significant 
impact on Britain, American exports declined from $108 million in 1807 to $22 
million in 1808.37  
 As Britain continued its domination over the seas, imports from outside of 
Europe to the continent declined between 1807 and 1814 by about half, and exports 
overseas by French merchants stayed at least a third less than prewar volumes.  As 
                                                          
33 Kevin H. O'Rourke.  “War and Welfare: Britain, France, and the United States 1807-14.” Oxford 
Economic Papers.  p. 9. 
34 Arthur Herman. To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World. p. 402-403.  
35 Andrew Lambert. Nelson: Britannia’s God of War. p. 188. 
36 Michael N. Schmitt.  "Aerial Blockades in Historical, Legal, and Practical Perspective." Journal 
of Legal Studies United States Air Force Academy. p. 26. 
37 H. Bicheno. War of 1812. In The Oxford Companion to Military History. Oxford University Press. 
Online. 
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 Britain continued to grow in naval abilities and France and its allies regressed, these 
imbalances continued to rapidly increase.38 
 The original Order in Council, in 1807, instituted the idea of a ‘cruising 
blockade’. Instead of ships sitting directly outside of a port, denying access, the 
Royal Navy would now aggressively pursue ships out at sea and lock down 
European trade by basically not allowing ships to even approach the coast.  Instead 
of difficult-to-maintain close blockading methods, or the standoffish, mentally 
taxing open technique, British ships and crews would work more as designed and 
actively pursue ships in the open ocean.39  
 By 1814 the British Navy had over 700 ships, including 150 ships of the 
line, 130,000 sailors and officers, with an additional half million men in the Army.  
It paid Austria, Russia, and Prussia millions of pounds a year, and managed to fight 
on two different continents.  Britain’s economy was still huge, and the military still 
immensely powerful, due to the simple fact that France’s use of the blockade was 
never able to really have any real effect on the British economy.  For the duration 
of the war Britain was able to make money and pay for its powerful Navy without 
entering a major crisis of confidence.40  Instead of avoiding trade with the European 
mainland, especially outside of France, Britain was able to efficiently send goods, 
at very high prices, to ports throughout the continent.  Unofficially at first, then 
with government sanction, and finally with government license, Britain encouraged 
merchants to break the French blockade.  
 Blockade running and smuggling into and out of France by British 
merchants grew in importance after about 1808.  Always in existence, the British 
started turning a blind eye towards its own nationals taking nonmilitary related 
goods, particularly foodstuffs and smaller household goods to France, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium.  This allowed for both a level of financial support to 
commercial sailors in Kent and Sussex,41 and probably more importantly, to absorb 
as much specie out of French held territory as possible, further strengthening the 
British economy and weakening France’s.  The economy of France faltered to the 
point that by 1810, though not officially welcomed, ports along the European coast 
opened to smugglers and would actively work around customs agents and military 
                                                          
38 Kevin H. O'Rourke.  “War and Welfare: Britain, France, and the United States 1807-14.” Oxford 
Economic Papers.  p. 14-17. 
39 C. I. Hamilton.  “Anglo-French Seapower and the Declaration of Paris.” The International History 
Review. p. 168. 
40 Arthur Herman. To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World. p. 413. 
41 Gavin Daly. “Napoleon and the 'City of Smugglers', 1810-1814.” The Historical Journal. p. 344. 
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 units in order to make transfers as efficient as possible, and eventually ensured a 
very limited number of trade licenses were allowed.42  
 Illicit trade on both sides was evident from almost the beginning of the 
blockades.  In 1809 a bad harvest in Britain forced the British to import grains from 
the continent.  Denmark, a French ally, was forced to pay for their own ships to 
deliver grain to their colony in Norway with timber to be used by the very navy 
blockading them.  False documentation, repainting normal crates as ‘captured’ 
products, and many other methods were used in order to circumvent the French 
blockade, almost all to the benefit of British trade.43 
 A novel idea related to blockade running was the trade that blockading ships 
themselves conducted.  Whether it was ships coming from the British Isles, or small 
vessels coming from the European mainland, crews would either buy or barter for 
any number of goods that were not supplied by the Admiralty.  Clothing, fresh fruits 
and vegetables, livestock, alcohol, and any number of other necessities were 
exchanged, often technically in violation of the orders sailors were obligated to 
enforce.44 
 Unrelenting and strategic use of blockades, whether from a distance or in 
close, ensured that the French could never pose a real threat to the British Isles 
through invasion, something Napoleon wanted for much of his tenure.  The 
blockades also limited trading options, almost ruined the continental economy, and 
kept a veritable king’s ransom of French and Spanish ships of the line tied down in 
harbors up and down the European coastline.  Though it would eventually take 
troops on the ground facing and beating the Grande Armee on the European 
mainland, it was the British Navy’s use of blockades that put the Army in the 
position to eventually win on the battlefield. 
 
 
    
                                                          
42 Gavin Daly. “Napoleon and the 'City of Smugglers', 1810-1814.” The Historical Journal. p. 335. 
43 N.A.M. Rodger.  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. p. 558. 
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